Much has been said about the Gulf states’ interest in regime change in Syria to steer Damascus away from Tehran and bolster their regional standing. The prevailing narrative is that Syria is a Sunni-majority country and will therefore ally itself with Gulf Sunni Arabs after the overthrow of the Baathist regime. But such an alliance is not a surety. Turkey, a Sunni-majority country and a neighbour, has established strong business relations with the commercial cities of Aleppo and Damascus and hosts prominent opposition figures; it is also bound to seek and assert influence in Syria.
So when the regime falls, as it certainly will, how can the Gulf states gain another advantage besides the inevitable schism between Damascus and Tehran?
The Gulf states are, in fact, better positioned because of deeply rooted tribal bonds that span Syria, especially in Al Jazira region (which makes about 40 per cent of the country), the countryside around cities like Deraa, Homs and Aleppo, and to a lesser degree near Hama, Damascus and even in the Druze stronghold of Suwaida. Channels of communication already exist between Gulf states and tribal leaders in some of these areas. These relationships have been sustained despite efforts by the Baathist regime to weaken tribal loyalties.
Members of the tribes migrated from the Arabian Peninsula to the Levant and Mesopotamia, some with Muslim compaigns in the 7th century and others later in search of water and grazing for livestock. But the majority of people of most tribes remained on the peninsula.
The Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain in 1916 divided Mesopotamia and the Levant along artificial national borders that persist today, splitting the tribes that spanned from Syria, Iraq and Jordan all the way to the peninsula. Relations, nevertheless, have been maintained.
The Egaidat is the largest tribal confederation in Al Jazira, with at least 1.5 million members, and links mainly to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Al Neim is the prominent tribal confederation in Deraa that includes the houses of Zoubi, Rifai and Hariri, and has a strong presence in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and also in the UAE, especially in the Northern Emirates. Al Eniza is another prominent Gulf tribal confederation with members in Al Jazira, Suwaida, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. Al Dhafir tribe has members in Al Jazira, Hama and a few in Deraa, as well as a presence in Saudi Arabia and less so in Kuwait. The Shammar confederation has at least one million members in Syria and is also one of the largest tribes in Saudi Arabia and Iraq.
Several leaders of the Syrian branches of the tribes continue regular visits to the Gulf states and often meet members of the royal families. A significant number have returned to the Gulf and become naturalised citizens mainly in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait. Many hold privileged positions in these countries and, as the bloody crackdown in Syria continues, tribal kinships have grown closer, with tribes in Deraa contacting their “cousins” in the Gulf asking for a firm diplomatic and economic position regarding Damascus.
There is a common perception that Syria’s population is now predominantly urban, and that tribalism is dwindling further because of the pro-democracy protests. As one influential resident of Deir Ezzor said last month: “What is happening is not just a revolt against the regime. It’s a revolt by the young against the tribes. Their fathers have been in limbo between Bedouin culture and modern culture, but this generation is breaking free.”
That is true to a degree, but details about the protest movement in Al Jazira show that the hold of the tribes remains strong. In the early months of protests, there was friction among the tribes on how to react. Al Jarrah, one of the powerful clans in the city of Al Bukamal, and a part of the Egaidat confederation, is led by a government official, who even armed some of the clan’s members to quell protests. This pushed another prominent tribe in the confederation, Al Dandal, to mediate between the government and young protesters, in an effort that failed. By then, some protesters had begun arming themselves and shooting at security forces.
The chief of the Egaidat, who has influence across the tribes in the confederation, asked the pro-government leader to disarm his people and stop working with the security forces. Finally, tribal leaders on all sides agreed to prevent clashes with the security forces and to not interfere in the protests.
Other leaders have refused to take part in the protest movement because they feel it is their responsibility to protect their clan. Abdullah Ghadawi, a political editor for the Saudi newspaper Okaz who is from Al Bukamal, told me one tribal leader had said that he was against the regime but he could not endanger his tribe by fighting. For the same reason, heads of families say they stand by President Bashar Al Assad only to discourage their children from taking part in protests. A similar scenario plays out in Suwaida and Raqqa, where there have been few protests.
This influence will remain strong for the foreseeable future. Politicians may be drawn from the ranks of the educated younger generation, unlike in the past when members of parliament were almost all tribal leaders, but the latter will still be respected.
Another possible trend that favours Gulf influence in Syria is the growing prominence of Salafism (as opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood, which has strong links to Turkey). Salafism is increasing especially in tribal areas, partly because of the return of Syrians who have worked in the Gulf.
How the Gulf states will use these levers of influence remains to be seen, however. “Saudi Arabia has a limited understanding of the nature and diversity of the Syrian opposition,” said Emile Hokayem, a Middle East analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, “and risks espousing too closely the perspective of its tribal and Wahhabi interlocutors.” Riyadh risks overreliance on the tribes, which remain largely divided.
But if these links are harnessed, the Gulf states’ influence will extend from the north of Syria to western Iraq and Jordan, creating a “tribal crescent” in place of Iran’s “Shia crescent” that today extends from Iran to Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
hhassan@thenational.ae
Follow on Twitter: @hhassan140
“The Declining Number of Christians in Aleppo, Syria,” by Ehsani
Posted: 18 Feb 2012 02:23 PM PST
Fewer Christians Live in Aleppo than is Commonly Thought
By Ehsani for Syria Comment
February 18, 2012
– No more than 100,000 Christians live in Aleppo – 3.3% of the city’s population, not the 12% commonly stated.
The exact number of religious minorities in Syria is difficult to ascertain. It is often reported that Christians make up somewhere between 9% and 12% of the population. Nearly two years ago, I happened to be visiting the city of Aleppo when a young Syrian Priest argued that the actual number of Syrian Christians is lower than the above consensus estimate. The initial purpose of the meeting at the time was to discuss the plight of Syrian youth.
This note will attempt to discuss the plight of the Christian population in Aleppo. The findings will point to the fact that this particular minority seems to have suffered from a precipitous drop in its numbers measured as a percentage of the population. Low fertility rate, abysmal economic growth, unfavorable laws, regional dynamics and frightening language from some extremists have combined to deal this minority a remarkable blow when it comes to their numbers at least within the ancient city of Aleppo.
The Data:
My initial foray into this topic started over two years ago during one of my visits to the city. During one of my meetings, a noted Christian Priest remarked how Christian youth were leaving in larger numbers than ever before. He proceeded to argue how the lack of job opportunities, low wages and exuberant housing prices had combined to drive the youth in his congregation to move abroad. His attempts to convince his young men to stay in Syria fell on deaf ears. The result has been a migration of alarming proportions. And this has been going on for years. Pressed to back up his assertions with data, the priest promised to provide me with hard statistics about the size of the Aleppine Christian community on my next trip.
Prior to visiting Syria in January 2012, I decided to call another Church leader who seemed to also have a wide following in the Aleppo Christian community. My goal was simple. I wanted him to use the next two months to find out how many Christians live in the city of Aleppo.
As it turns out, Christian priests and bishops keep tally of their parishioners by keeping track of the number of families under their respective churches. The Assyrian Orthodox Church for example has 1300 families. Approximately every 300 families are assigned to each Priest. This gives the church a reasonable ability to calculate the number of people under its roof. This is made easier by the fact that Christian births and marriages are meticulously recorded by the Church; the registration process allows the community to keep close track of the number of its parishioners.
There are elven Christian denominations in the city of Aleppo. Listed below are the approximate number of families that belong to each of the eleven churches:
Roman (Melkite) Catholic 2,500
Roman (Antiochian) Orthodox 1,000
Armenian Catholic 1,300
Armenian Orthodox 10,000
Syriac Catholic 1,300
Syrian Orthodox 1,300
Maronites 400
Chaldean 400
Latin 400
Arab Anglican 100
Armenian Anglican 300
The total number of Christian families in Aleppo is therefore 19,000. If one assumes that the average family size is 5 (a generous assumption), the number of Christians in Aleppo is below 100,000. It is of course difficult to accurately define the total number of Aleppo’s population. It is often argued that the number is around 3 million people if you exclude the reef (rural area) and as high as 5 million people when one includes areas like Hayyan, Hreitan, Albab and Mumbej.
If accurate, the 19,000 Christian families of Aleppo means that Christians make up only 3.5% of its 3 million residents.
When I shared the data with most Christians in the city of Aleppo, the response was mixed. Some nodded their heads in agreement. Some seemed surprised and demanded that they look at the numbers in more detail. Not one was able to refute them outright.
Many readers of this note are likely to be surprised by these findings. I urge them to correct my numbers if they are false. I would be grateful for anyone who can find holes in the above percentage.
Aleppo and Damascus are supposed to make up half of the population of Syria. However, Aleppo has hardly any Christians in its reef or countryside. This is not the case in other parts of the country like Wadi Al Nasara (The Valley of Christians) around Homs for example. The Priests I spoke with did not have Christian population statistics for the country as a whole, but insisted that the total number of Christians in Syria probably does not surpass one million. These means that they probably make up between 4% to 5% of the total population rather than the 9% to 12% that is usually cited.
Back to Aleppo:
Wikipedia still states that “Aleppo is home to many eastern Christian congregations and that “more than 250,000 Christians live in the city representing about 12% of the total population.”
The results of my own findings are vastly different from such numbers.
The last known census took place in 1944. During that time, Christians were known to number 112,110. This meant that they represented near 38% of the city’s population of just over 300,000. This statistic was confirmed when the political representatives for the city council were assigned. Of the 12 members to the council, 5 were Christians. This was an official confirmation that they made up nearly 40% of the city’s residents.
This number dropped significantly over the ensuing 20 years culminating with the arrival of Abdul Nassar. Following WW II, many Armenians decided to migrate to Armenia. Soon afterwards and during the early 1950′s, a significant percentage of Christians belonging to mostly lower income groups left for Venezuela and other parts of Latin America. Those in the upper income groups were dealt a severe economic blow upon the arrival of Abdul Nasser. The misguided nationalization drive of the period sent many wealthy families packing. Lebanon, Canada and other Western nations were the likely destination.
By the early 1960′s, the Christian population of Aleppo had dropped to as low as 20%. A Church official present at the meeting suggested that by the time Hafez Assad took over power in 1970, Christians in Aleppo were merely 10% of the city’s population.
Over the next four decades, this number has dropped to as low 3.5%. Wikipedia’s number of 12% is widely off the mark. It is expected that I will encounter significant challenges to the data I presented. I welcome the input of those who do.
While on topic, it is worth remembering that the Christian existence in this land predates Islam. Christianity was born in the Levant. It was the Roman Empire that transported Christianity from the Levant to the Western part of the Empire. Later on during the new roman empire (Byzantine empire), it was a Damascene Christian Monophysite bishop that informed Khalid Ibn al-Walid that it was possible to breach city walls by attacking a position only lightly defended at night by opposing Byzantine soldiers. The Byzantine-Sassanid wars of 602-628 had exhausted the local populace. The negative treatment of the western Byzantine Empire’s rulers turned the local largely Christian population against their rule. As the Arab conquests reached the gates of Damascus, Christian Syrians were hardly opposed to the new invaders.
Economics:
Perhaps no single issue has done more harm to Syria than its economic performance over the recent decades. The failure of the country’s experiment with socialism has been painful. So has been the state’s allocation of its water resources under the banner of self-sufficiency. Another abject failure has come from the lack of supply of housing as attempts to regulate the process of “Tanzeem” have taken decades. An explosion in Illegal housing was the inevitable consequence as legal housing unit prices rose beyond the economic means of most Syrians. What started as a noble exercise to help the poor afford basic needs decades ago has morphed into one of the most debilitating liabilities for the treasury. Subsidies may have been affordable when Syria had 8 million people and double the oil output. But they have sucked the government’s coffers dry now that the population has tripled and that oil output has fallen by half. Last but not least is a debilitated public sector that is terribly inefficient and has monopolized vast sectors of the economy, stifling private initiative and weighing on Syria’s potential growth like a stone.
To be sure, the word “Socialism” was finally dropped from the country’s new constitution. However, Article 13 continues to insist that:
“The national economy shall be based on the development of the public and private economic activities”. The same article also states that “ The state shall guarantee the protection of producers and consumers”. Finally, the constitution now dictates that “Taxes are imposed on an equitable and progressive bases which achieve the principles of equality and social justice”.
The combination of the above set of economic principals is a clear indication that the country’s transformation away from socialism will be slow and uneven.
Many of the readers of this forum are aware that I have been warning about the damaging effects of Syria’s anemic economy for years. It was my interest in the subject that triggered the initial meeting when I wanted to understand the plight of the youth and their preference to leave the country seeking better economic opportunities abroad. According to those present, economic issues were by far the most important factor behind the accelerated immigration trends. In one month alone, 400 Christian families migrated from Aleppo to Lebanon following the disastrous Nationalization policies of Abdul Nasser in the 1960′s.
The Syrian Personal Status Law:
Under Syrian law, a Christian can convert to Islam. It is illegal for a Muslim to convert to Christianity of course. Inter-religious marriages seem to have provided Church leaders and the Christian community in general with a major challenge.
Christian women who decide to marry a Muslim man have to make a critical decision due to the country’s inheritance and estate laws. If she stays Christian rather than convert, she will inherit zero from her husband following his death. The only way she can inherit is if she converts to Islam. Civil weddings do not exist in Syria.
This is why many Syrian Christian families find it extremely hard to accept inter-religious marriages. It is also why they seem to prefer to live in Christian-only buildings where the chances of young adults interacting with those from a different sect are lower. Christians feel that the civil laws are unfavorable to them.
For the record, many Christians were hopeful that article 3 was going to be dropped from the new constitution. Such expectations were not met when they found out that “The President has to be part of the Muslim faith.”
The plight of Iraq’s Christians:
Syrian Christians have been badly affected by the recent experience of Iraqi Christians. Aleppo has been home to many Iraqis who reside in the city as they await their immigration visas. Most attempt to leave the region for good. Stories of Christian persecution in Iraq have had a profound effect on Syria’s Christians. Many Syrian Christians are convinced that their future in the region may be no brighter than that of their Iraqi coreligionists.
The Religious Satellite Channels:
Nothing seems to send greater chills down the spine of most Syrian Christians than watching extremist religious figures rally their listeners and supporters on satellite television. Adnan Ar’ur may well speak for millions of Syrians. His steady appearances, however, seem to convince Syrian Christians to pack up and leave.
Conclusion:
The percentage of Aleppo’s Christians has been in steady decline since the early 1900’s. That the number has dropped from over 40% as recently as the 1940′s to the current 3.5% of the population of this city is remarkable. This phenomenon is not new. Many have known about these trends and have written about them. The consensus however has been that Christians still make up 9%-12% of Syria’s population. This admittedly unscientific study challenges those assumptions. Instead, it argues that Syrian Christians may have dropped to as low as 4%-6% of the total population and as low as 3.5% in Aleppo. Readers can draw their own conclusions about what implications this has for the country going forward. It may suggest that authoritarian support for President Assad and for “secularism” is not as important as sometimes stated.
Syrian Christians in the Diaspora continue to have a profound and strong attachment to the land. The sentiment amongst the Christians inside the country is unmistakable. They seem resigned to the fact that their numbers are heading south. When I presented my 3.5% number to many of them, many simply nodded their heads. The vast majority of them may not know the exact number but many have indicated to me that it does “feel” to them like 3.5%. Aleppo’s overwhelmingly Sunni countryside has been suffering from a deep economic depression for decades. Many of Syria’s poorest towns are those surrounding Aleppo. During the day, men from these areas descend on the city, looking for work and better opportunity. The population of Aleppo has soared. Indeed, most Aleppines feel like they are living in a city of 5 million people. Seen from this perspective, the 19,000 families of this ancient land feel that they only make up 1.9% of its larger populace.
The Wide Spread Effects of Economics on All Syrians:
While this note listed a number of factors behind the drop in the percentage of Christians that make up the population of this land, it is the opinion of this writer that poor economic policy lies at the heart of this issue. The negative impact of economic mismanagement has hit all religious communities of Syria. Presented with the chance, most Syrian youth chose to migrate out of the country. The lack of economic upward mobility has meant that most young Syrians have found it difficult to carve out a reasonable economic future for themselves. Yes, Syria, like the rest of the Arab world, could do with less corruption and more democracy and freedom. None of this is likely to matter much in the long run unless the country can design a vibrant industrial policy, find sufficient energy and renewable water resources, improve its outmoded education and health care systems and make legal housing affordable for the vast majority of the populace. Let us remember that this region needs to create nearly 80 million jobs over the next twenty years. Syria alone needs to create close to 300,000 jobs a year. On current trends, this is nearly impossible to accomplish and it is the reason why we are at the beginning of our black tunnel.
Questions sur la crise syrienne
Interview croisé de Karim Bitar, directeur de recherche à l’IRIS, Antoine Fleyfel et Fabrice Balanche (La Croix, 14 février 2012)
Alors que le conflit en Syrie prend des allures de guerre civile, trois experts en analysent les causes et les conséquences, notamment pour les chrétiens.
Rebelles syriens à Idlib (nord-ouest du pays), vendredi 10 février. Depuis le début de la révolte, il y a près d’un an, on compte au moins 6 000 morts.
Le régime syrien a lancé mardi 14 février donné un assaut le plus violent depuis des jours sur la ville rebelle de Homs, avec « en moyenne deux roquettes qui tombent par minute », a indiqué l’Observatoire syrien des droits de l’Homme (OSDH) en début d’après-midi.
Au moins six civils ont été tués, venant s’ajouter aux 6 000 morts de la répression du régime de Bachar Al Assad depuis onze mois.
Dans la troisième ville du pays où plus de 300 personnes ont péri depuis le 4 février, le temps presse et la crise humanitaire est de plus en plus intolérable. Les gens sont « entassés dans les abris » et « les morts sont enterrés depuis une semaine dans les jardins car même les cimetières et les tombes sont visés » indiquait mardi 14 février à l’AFP Hadi Abdallah, membre du « Conseil de la révolution de Homs ».
L’incapacité du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU à se mettre d’accord sur une action collective a « encouragé le gouvernement syrien à lancer un assaut sans retenue dans le but d’écraser la dissidence », a estimé lundi 13 février la haut-commissaire de l’ONU aux droits de l’Homme Navi Pillay. Profondément divisée sur la crise, la communauté internationale l’est encore plus sur la proposition d’une force de paix avancée la veille par la Ligue arabe : Paris a mis en garde contre toute action « à caractère militaire », Moscou exigé un cessez-le-feu et Washington souligné qu’en l’absence de paix, une telle initiative était compliquée.
« La Croix » a interrogé trois spécialistes du pays Antoine Fleyfel, théologien et philosophe franco libanais, Karim Bitar, chercheur associé à l’Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques (Iris), et Fabrice Balanche, maître de conférences à l’Université Lyon II réagissent passent en revue la situation intérieure du pays, le contexte géostratégique et la place des chrétiens.
LA CROIX : Quelle est la situation intérieure en Syrie ?
Antoine Fleyfel : « Je redoute vraiment une guerre civile. D’une part, parce que le conflit s’est militarisé entre l’armée syrienne et l’armée de la Syrie libre. D’autre part, parce que des factions islamistes ont tout intérêt à mettre en avant des aspects confessionnels dans ce conflit, pour que les oppositions entre sunnites et alaouites, entre musulmans et chrétiens prennent le dessus. Aujourd’hui, plusieurs scénarios sont possibles, selon que le régime de Bachar Al Assad tombe ou pas. »
Karim Bitar : « En Syrie, deux éléments ouvrent la voie à une guerre civile : la montée des tensions entre communautés religieuses et la militarisation excessive de l’armée et des opposants. On n’est plus du tout dans une logique de révolution arabe comme en Tunisie. Pour l’instant, Bachar Al Assad n’a pas trop de soucis à se faire. L’armée lui est fidèle, il a de nombreux soutiens extérieurs comme l’Iran, la Chine et la Russie, et il sait que les Occidentaux ne se risqueront pas à une intervention en 2012. Mais je pense qu’à moyen terme, il est condamné, car, économiquement, le régime est très affaibli. Les sanctions économiques qui l’empêchent de vendre son pétrole à l’Europe représentent une perte de 450 millions d’euros par mois. Les recettes fiscales ont également baissé de 50 %. Bientôt, Damas ne pourra plus financer la répression, sauf si l’Iran lui fait des chèques en blanc. »
Fabrice Balanche : « On ne peut pas généraliser, mais dans certains endroits, comme à Homs, on peut déjà parler d’une guerre civile communautaire. L’armée syrienne, majoritairement composée d’alaouites, attaque régulièrement les quartiers sunnites. Autre indicateur, on trouve beaucoup de familles divisées entre opposants et partisans du régime. Pour le moment, Bachar Al Assad a en face de lui une opposition très divisée. Les dirigeants du Conseil national syrien (CNS, la principale coalition) et le Conseil national pour le changement démocratique (CNCD, opposition ancienne favorable à la laïcité) se détestent. En plus, ils ne sont pas d’accord sur le principe d’une intervention étrangère en Syrie, réclamée par le CNS, et à laquelle le CNCD s’oppose catégoriquement. Le CNS ne représente qu’une partie de l’opposition basée à l’étranger. Son chef, Burhan Ghalioun, n’est qu’une marionnette, il n’a aucun pouvoir. C’est le Qatar et les Frères musulmans qui pilotent tout. »
LA CROIX : Quel est le contexte géostratégique ?
Antoine Fleyfel : « Plusieurs pays occidentaux, dont la France, ont pressé le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU d’adopter une résolution contre la Syrie. Après un précédent texte en octobre 2011, bloqué par un veto russe et chinois, les 15 pays membres du Conseil de sécurité ont renoncé le 4 février dernier, pour ne pas heurter Moscou, à adopter un texte qui soutenait les décisions prises par la Ligue arabe en janvier en vue d’assurer une transition vers la démocratie en Syrie, avec transfert des pouvoirs du président syrien Bachar Al Assad à son vice-président. Désormais, la Ligue arabe accepte de fournir un soutien politique et matériel à l’opposition syrienne et de demander au Conseil de sécurité la formation d’une force conjointe ONU-Arabes pour mettre fin aux violences en Syrie. »
Karim Bitar : « Parmi toutes les révolutions arabes, le cas syrien est le plus complexe. Actuellement, on assiste à une guerre froide entre l’axe Iran-Irak-Hamas et les pétromonarchies du Golfe, qui cherchent à étendre leur influence dans la zone. L’ironie du sort, c’est que la Syrie, qui autrefois instrumentalisait les conflits interreligieux sur le territoire libanais, joue aujourd’hui le rôle du Liban : elle est devenue l’objet de l’affrontement entre les puissances régionales. L’Iran fournit des armes au régime, tandis que l’Arabie saoudite soutient l’opposition syrienne. »
Fabrice Balanche : « Au-delà du contexte régional, il y a clairement une lutte d’influence entre les grandes puissances. Depuis l’arrivée de Vladimir Poutine au pouvoir, la Russie s’efforce de reprendre pied dans les zones où l’URSS était présente avant l’effondrement du bloc soviétique, que ce soit dans le Caucase, en Asie centrale ou au Moyen-Orient. Surtout, Moscou craint la contagion des révolutions arabes à l’intérieur même de ses frontières. De son côté, la Chine, dont la montée en puissance est plus récente, aspire à jouer un rôle diplomatique de premier plan. Elle veut aussi stabiliser la Syrie, car elle a besoin d’hydrocarbures pour se développer. Ces deux alliés de Damas ont donc intérêt à voir Bachar Al Assad rester au pouvoir, cela explique pourquoi ils bloquent la situation à l’ONU en apposant systématiquement leur veto. »
LA CROIX : Où en sont les chrétiens ?
Antoine Fleyfel : La situation des chrétiens – environ 7 % de la population syrienne – varie selon les villes. Quelques familles chrétiennes de Homs et Hama fuient les combats pour se réfugier dans d’autres régions du pays, mais, pour le moment, il n’y a pas d’exode massif des chrétiens hors de Syrie. Dans la plupart des cas, musulmans et chrétiens subissent le même sort.
Depuis le début des troubles, la grande majorité des chrétiens syriens ménage le pouvoir en place, avec qui ils ont toujours eu de grandes affinités et à cause de leur crainte de voir la révolte aboutir à l’installation d’un régime islamiste. D’ailleurs, l’opposant et militant chrétien des droits de l’homme Michel Kilo, qui comptait parmi les “pères” du printemps arabe, a pris ses distances par rapport à la révolte syrienne à cause de la tournure violente et armée qu’elle a prise. Lui, comme d’autres chrétiens, revendiquait des réformes, mais pas la chute du régime de Bachar Al Assad. La plupart des autorités chrétiennes, catholiques et orthodoxes confondues, ont pour leur part pris position en faveur du régime, d’où la crainte des chrétiens d’être victimes de représailles de la part des opposants. Et puis, les chrétiens syriens n’ont pas oublié ce qui s’est passé pendant la guerre au Liban (1975-1990) et ils ont sous les yeux l’exemple de l’Irak : la crainte est réelle pour eux qu’une intervention internationale puisse contribuer à la montée de l’islamisme. »
Karim Bitar : « Les chrétiens de Syrie sont complètement traumatisés par l’expérience irakienne. Plus de la moitié des chrétiens d’Irak ont dû fuir leur pays sous la menace des persécutions, et 1,2 million d’entre eux ont trouvé refuge en Syrie après la chute de Saddam Hussein. C’est pour cette raison que la communauté chrétienne et notamment les patriarches restent fidèles au régime, mais ce soutien pourrait devenir dangereux si Bachar Al Assad finit par tomber. Il y a quand même quelques chrétiens dans l’opposition. Georges Sabra, l’opposant chrétien qui dirige le Parti du peuple démocratique, pourrait d’ailleurs prendre la suite de Burhan Ghalioun à la tête du Conseil national syrien. Ce serait un signal fort pour encourager les chrétiens de Syrie à se désolidariser du pouvoir. »
Fabrice Balanche : « Les chrétiens de Syrie, en majorité des grecs-orthodoxes et des arméniens, sont très inquiets pour leur avenir. Beaucoup d’entre eux ont été intégrés dans l’administration et même l’armée syriennes, et ont apporté leur soutien au pouvoir en place dès le mois d’avril 2011. Car tant que le régime de Bachar Al Assad résiste, ils sont à l’abri de l’hégémonie des sunnites, majoritaires, qui pourraient imposer un islam radical. Ils redoutent que l’expérience irakienne se répète. Déjà, certains ont fui après avoir été persécutés par les salafistes syriens. Un véritable processus d’élimination des minorités chrétiennes est en marche au Proche-Orient, et il a commencé dès le début du XXe siècle, en Turquie, avec le génocide arménien. »
High-Tech Trickery in Homs?
By Sharmine Narwani – Tue, 2012-02-14 15:15- The Sandbox- Al-Akhbar
What was surely meant to be a clever display of media-friendly visuals to illustrate Syrian regime violence in Homs, has instead raised more questions than answers.
US State Department satellite images of the embattled city were posted on Facebook last Friday by US Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford, who complains: “A terrible and tragic development in Syria is the use of heavy weaponry by the Assad regime against residential neighborhoods.”
The “satellite photos,” says Ford, “have captured both the carnage and those causing it — the artillery is clearly there, it is clearly bombing entire neighborhoods…We are intent on exposing the regime’s brutal tactics for the world to see.”
But within 24 hours, the blog Moon of Alabama had taken a hammer to the ambassador’s claims. A detailed examination of satellite imagery by the bloggers revealed numerous discrepancies in Washington’s allegations. Mainly, their investigations point to the fact that Ford’s satellite images were “of guns training within military barracks or well known training areas and not in active deployment.”
Moon of Alabama posts its own satellite images, graphics and diagrams to bolster its argument – and these are well worth a look.
The US envoy’s questionable claims don’t stop at satellite images, however. In his Facebook post, Ford insists: “There is no evidence that the opposition — even those opposition members who have defected from the military — has access to or has employed such heavy weapons. “ By this, he means the “artillery” used “to pound civilian apartment buildings and homes from a distance.”
Then why is there satellite photo evidence of destruction in pro-regime Alawi areas?
Fast-forward to CNN’s very own Jonathan King, who broadcast satellite images of Homs on February 9, the day before the State Department loaded their photos on the web. King’s images of Homs are dated February 5, two days after violence erupted in the city, focusing heavily in the Baba Amr neighborhood where opposition gunmen are allegedly present:
King’s presentation of “shelling, fires and damage” to Homs shows destruction of property consistent with the use of heavy weapons: “It’s like a ghost town – with no cars at all, there’s damage in the roads and so much damage on the top of the buildings.”
Zooming in on three different sections of the same Homs neighborhood to show before-and-after images of the destruction, King says: “Now obviously, we’re not there, but this powerful satellite imagery tends to support the accounts from activists that there’s a lot of shelling and fighting going on in the city, and a lot of fires.”
There is only one problem with his account. Most of the alleged fighting, shelling, destruction and killing reported widely in the international media took place in the Baba Amr neighborhood of Homs, southwest of the city, and an anti-regime stronghold.
But all three satellite images shown by King are in al-Zahra neighborhood, a pro-regime area consisting mainly of Alawis, who belong to the same Muslim minority sect as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.
That is a stunning revelation. Pro-regime civilians in Homs and other Syrian areas have complained of attacks, kidnappings and killings by armed opposition groups for months now, with little attention received by foreign media.
And it completely undermines Ford’s contention that: “There is no evidence that the opposition…has access to or has employed such heavy weapons. “
Let’s look at some screenshots from CNN’s presentation and compare it to screenshots taken from Google Maps. The first visual is of King pointing to the three highlighted areas of destruction in Homs:
CNN’s satellite images have been turned 90 degrees clockwise in their own presentation of the photos, so in this next screenshot, we have shifted their visuals so that they are north facing – to help with comparison to our pictures in a normal north-south format. This will also make things easier for those readers compelled to rush out and conduct their own web search on the area.
Zooming into one highlighted area of destruction, you can see that the two photos – CNN’s and ours – are an exact match. To the north of the horizontal road is a lot marked by a large tree to its left. South of that same road, buildings are positioned at a distinct diagonal angle. This area is inside Homs’ al-Zahra neighborhood.
This next screenshot zooms out so that you can see the placement of CNN’s three areas of damage – all clearly within al-Zahra, which is marked by a red circle. In the bottom left hand corner of the shot is a circular area that we included as a marker to help readers distinguish al-Zahra’s location in proximity to other areas in Homs. This is where the Citadel of Homs is located.
The final screenshot is of Homs from a distance so that it is possible to view the distance between Baba Amr (circled in blue) to the left of the picture, and al-Zahra, to the right. The Citadel in the previous shot is between the two neighborhoods.
An image is no longer worth a thousand words
Photos and video footage showing scenes of violence have been streaming out of Homs since reports of heavy fighting first broke on February 3. It is hard to glean much from these because there is not enough information in the visuals to confirm the source of gunfire or shelling. The satellite images posted by the State Department on February 6 – according to the Moon of Alabama blog – do not actually show the Syrian army engaged in battle, as suggested by Ambassador Ford when he claims:
“Satellite photos have captured both the carnage and those causing it — the artillery is clearly there, it is clearly bombing entire neighborhoods.”
But his statement about armed opposition groups not having the weaponry to fight from afar is now questionable given the CNN shots of damaged buildings and “burn craters” in the road – yet even this is not conclusive.
If you don’t believe an image any longer, what do you do about this kind of allegation by Ford? One of the few videos I find credible – and that, only because in it we see the death of an actual “known” person that has not been contested – is this footage of Gilles Jacquier (warning: graphic images contained), the France 2 cameraman killed while participating in a government-sponsored tour of Homs. Jacquier was killed in the pro-regime neighborhood of Akrama, home mainly to a mix of Alawis and Christians who originally migrated from rural areas. Pro-opposition journalist Omar Idilbi had once dubbed this area “the castle of the regime.”
When allegations flew left and right about the source of the projectile that killed Jacquier and reportedly eight others that day, the Arab League monitors on the ground in Syria investigated and concluded: “mission reports from Homs indicate that the French journalist was killed by opposition mortar shells.”
Syria has destroyed for me all faith in the images I once trusted. People on both sides of this conflict are manipulating visual media to propagandize toward their political goals. The problem with this is that many genuine documented stories are now disregarded because of the skepticism of readers like myself.
Governments and media should be taken to task for their complicity in the dissemination of false information. There are lives at stake, after all – the very lives that fuel their pitiful “outrage.”
Many thanks to Adel Alsalman for the screenshots in this blog
Sharmine Narwani is a commentary writer and political analyst covering the Middle East. You can follow her on twitter
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